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INTRODUCTION
The two major contributions to oligopoly theory since the 1930s are the full-cost principle (which empirically undermined the validity of marginal analysis) and the limit pricing theory, which recognised that oligopoly must confront potential competition as distinct from actual competition among existing rivals. Introducing the threat of entry alongside the hypothesis that firms recognise their mutual interdependence set the foundation for theorising about firms' strategic behaviour (Bhagwati, 1970; Stigler 1983) . This shift of attention occurred early due to Philip W. S. Andrews (1949) , Roy F. Harrod (1952) , Joe S. Bain (1949 Bain ( , 1956 and Paolo Sylos Labini (1957) , especially after Franco Modigliani's formalization (1958) . 1 Modigliani's review of Sylos's and Bain's books is considered the departure point for developments during the 1960s and 1970s of entry-preventing models (McGee, 1980). 2 However, Modigliani's interpretation diverged in many respects from Sylos' major aims, and his review should be considered an original development of Sylos' model, not simply as its translation into mathematical language. Sylos' analysis was devoted to the dynamic relations among market structures, income distribution, economic development and involuntary unemployment. In other words, he investigated the relation between technical progress and industrial concentration. In contrast and notwithstanding his interest in macroeconomic and Keynesian theory, 3 Modigliani's review examined only Sylos' microeconomic static analysis, notably the role of firms' expectations and the Sylos postulate for determining long-run equilibrium price and output. In doing so, 1 In his 1935 Economica paper Nicholas Kaldor already recognized the effect of potential competition stating that established producers will act as if their own demand curves were much more elastic than they are. 2 John S. McGee (1980, p. 308 ) characterized Modigliani's formalization as the «purest and clearest» expression of the limit pricing theory, labelling it the «classical» theory. For McGee's contribution to limit pricing theory, see Nicola Giocoli (2003) . According to George Stigler (1983, p. 542 ) the limit pricing theory «had a long prehistory under the name of potential competition, but it was given an explicit formulation by Sylos Labini (1962) , Joe Bain (1949) and Franco Modigliani (1958) ». 3 Modigliani was working on the relation between non-competitive markets, rigidity of real wages and involuntary unemployment in his monetary notes (1955 in Modigliani Papers henceforth MP) at the basis of his 1963 paper.
Modigliani departed from Sylos' objective approach to the oligopoly problem as an alternative to subjective analysis based on reaction functions.
There are two explanations for Modigliani's reading of Sylos' book. The first, evident in their correspondence, is that he rejected Sylos' macroeconomics for confusing real and monetary causes of involuntary unemployment. The second pertains to Modigliani's (3) the validity of the profit maximization assumption (especially the relation between short and long-run profit maximization); (4) the role of psychological variables (Cournot's reaction functions) in determining equilibrium price and output.
According to Hall and Hitch, firms' awareness of their interdependence leads to an indeterminate individual demand curve and corresponding marginal revenue (1939, p. 15) . Their empirical investigations showed that firms generally make no effort to estimate the demand curve, its elasticity and their marginal costs; they price by applying the simple «full-cost formula». Among their significant conclusions was that any maximum profit resulting from applying this rule of thumb emerges accidentally or as an evolutionary by-product. This outcome partly is the consequence of the threat of entry: «If prices are in the neighbourhood of full cost, they are not raised by actual or tacit agreement because it is thought that, while this would pay in the short run, it would lead to an undermining of the firms by new entrants in the long run» (1939, p. 22) . They also showed the impossibility of a uniquely determined equilibrium price. 8
The introduction of firms' reactions to potential competitors underpinned the interpretation of nonmaximizing behaviour as intentionally intended to forestall entry, giving a rational foundation for using a simple rule of thumb. It also represented the departure point for constructing a new analytical framework based on strategic considerations (Rothschild, 1947) .
Recognition of a crucial role for conditions of entry in determining equilibrium price was due to Bain (1949 Bain ( , 1956 , Andrews (1949), Harrod (1952) , Edwards (1955) , Lydall (1955) , Sylos Labini unfortunately was fudge in the definition of the individual demand curve» (1953, p. 584) . As reminded by Stigler (1983, p. 537 ), «Not one of the earlier analysis (…) has been absorbed into the mainstream of price theory as a regular and significant part of the analysis of the working of markets and industries». According to Martin Shubik (1959, p. viii) : «the theory of games of strategy … opens the possibility … of unifying the numerous casuistic treatments of oligopolistic market forms. The theory of games provides a model for economic behavior no matter what the market structure is». 7 Hall and Hitch's full cost theory emerged from empirical research of firms' behaviour in England. Some results had been presented by Roy Harrod and Hall in papers before the British Association in 1937 and 1938. 8 According to them, the price can be set by the strong firm at its own full cost level and accepted by other firms in the «group»; it can emerge as the result of an agreement among firms, or by trial and error with all firms making adjustments.
(1957) and Modigliani (1958) . Even if their models addressed different hypotheses-such as collusive or non-collusive oligopoly, homogeneous or differentiated products-all investigate the relation between conditions of entry and deterrent pricing by established firms; they abandon the profit maximization assumption and accept a cost-based rule (rather than marginal analysis) for determination of equilibrium price, establishing the basis for subsequent developments and refinements of the limit pricing theory. 9 Disagreements among economists who followed their respective approaches mainly concerned the level of the entry-prevention price as the result of different hypotheses about existing firms' reactions to threats of entry. Sylos' microeconomic analysis sought to show that industry equilibrium price and output depend on conditions of entry. He attempted to fill the lacuna of the kinked demand curve which, according to Sylos, assumed without explaining the amount of mark-up, and to demonstrate the rational foundation of the full cost principle and its inconsistency with marginal analysis. The singularity of his oligopolistic model originated in its assumption of technological discontinuity as a barrier to entry and the coexistence of large, medium and small firms within an industry. Sylos numerically demonstrated that the equilibrium price (defined as the price that does not attract new firms) depends on the initial industrial structure (crièe par hazard) and conditions of entry. His examples were based on both the full cost formula and the distinction between a price that guarantees minimum profit (P m ) and the «exclusion price» that discourages potential competitors (P c , with P c <P m ):
III. SYLOS' OLIGOPOLY THEORY AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS
«If the price leaders intend to prevent the entry of new firms of a given type, they must keep the price below the level which would give the new firms their minimum profit rate: the 'entry preventing' price, P c , is lower than P m » (1962, p. 40 see also 1957, p. 50 and 1956, p. 48) .
He also introduced the definition of «elimination price» as a price beneath the variable cost of firms that price leaders want to eliminate (ibid.). Nonetheless, Sylos argued that most efficient firms are uninterested in starting price wars to eliminate established rivals because their costs may exceed possible gains. Sylos concluded that even if several equilibrium prices exist, each corresponding to the initial industrial structure, the price generally settles at a level slightly above the entrypreventing price of the least efficient firms (i.e., smaller firms). Consequently, larger firms maintain extra-profits in the long run thanks to their higher efficiency (resulting from employing different technologies, not from entrepreneurial abilities). 13
Following Sraffa's approach 14 , Sylos' model was conceived to set an objective foundation under the analysis of oligopolistic markets, rejecting Cournot-type and Edgeworth-type solutions based on «abstract hypothesis of an essentially psychological nature» (1962, p. 19 ):
«One method often used to put some sort of order into the galaxy of hypotheses and solutions is to start with the simplest case of oligopoly, duopoly, and to distinguish between Cournot-type and Edgeworth-type solutions. The former end up with the conclusion that price is determinate and equilibrium stable, the latter with the conclusion that price is not necessarily determinate nor equilibrium necessarily stable. Both types of solutions rest on abstract hypothesis of an essentially psychological nature. More and more complicated assumptions have been made about "reaction curves" and "conjectural variations". The production of such hypotheses and solutions has assumed alarming proportions … In contrast with this school of economists there is another that propounds a single, very simple and perfectly determinate, solution, based on the assumption of a kinked demand curve» (1962, pp. 19-20; see also 1957 and 1956, pp. 25-26) . 15 13 Lydall (1955, p. 304) recognized the possibility that most efficient firms could realize extra-profit even in the presence of limit-price policies: «… In our model … the limit is in the price, not the profit. The distinction is important because at the same price-level one firm can make much larger profits than other: and this is the essence of the struggle …» Furthermore: «If we look at the pricing problem in this terms we shall see that there is nothing surprising in the tendency of monopolistic firms to limit their prices to what they regard as a 'normal' level. This level is somewhere in the region below the no-entry ceiling .... It fluctuates with the conditions of new entry, which themselves depend on the policy of the existing firms. But, given all the conditions, there will be a 'normal' price to which serious firms, which have their long-term interests in mind, will limit themselves .… [The full-cost pricing method] can be understood as an unconscious application of the no-entry ceiling price» (ibid., p. 308). 14 Sylos derives from Sraffa (1926) the hypothesis of constant marginal cost up to the limit of plant capacity while firms generally produce in regime of decreasing average costs, as well as the conclusion that in modern industrial situations competition is a limiting case. In his letter Modigliani criticized Sylos' identification of direct costs with short and long run marginal costs and consequently his conclusion on the inconsistency of the hypothesis of constant direct costs with perfect competition.with perfect competition. 15 Sylos is quoting Dante (Inferno, Canto XIII): «I believe that he believed that I believed». The objective basis of his analysis is often re-affirmed, see for example: «We shall try to identify such objective elements as may, in real situations, serve as a basis for price determination. Otherwise, we would run the danger of remaining in the fantastic world of reaction curves and conjectural variations … And we would risk propounding explanations which may be formally correct but of little or no help in a concrete analysis of any particular industry» (1962, p. 34, also in 1957 and 1956, p. 42 where p 1 m is the equilibrium price (technology 1 is the less efficient), and p j m is the minimum price allowed by method of production j.
When the above condition is not satisfied, a firm adopting technology j will find it convenient to enter the market. Thus, following Sylos' hypothesis of constant output, the equilibrium price will fall below p 1 m , eliminating firms of size 1 and 2. This mainly happens under the hypothesis of large market size (with respect to j) where a production increases equal to x j is negligible as well as the corresponding price reduction. Thus, according to Modigliani, there will be only firms adopting the maximum scale of technology (that is, the number of coexisting techniques of production will tend towards one) and extra-profit will tend towards zero.
Modigliani also pointed out that his definition of the entry condition is consistent with Sylos' conclusion that «large markets … increase the likelihood of an aggressive price policy on the part of large firms, designed to eliminate small and medium firms. Therefore, the larger the market, the larger tends to be the average size of firms and the lower the equilibrium price» (1962, p. 50 He then accepted on the basis of detailed comments of the 1956 draft he wrote the year earlier and asked to Sylos to return them. Modigliani's review parallels them closely. The main difference is that in his review he does not discuss Sylos' macroeconomic analysis, giving the impression that the second and third parts of the book were separate from the oligopoly model whereas the connection between the micro and macroeconomic analysis represented one of Sylos' major aims.
Furthermore, in «New Developments on the Oligopoly Front», Modigliani discusses Sylos' (1957) and Bain's (1956) Modigliani, October 18, 1957, in MP ) and a classical contribution to the limit pricing theory. It represented a first step towards application of game theory and strategic behaviour to the oligopoly problem. The Sylos postulate was in fact regarded during the 1970s as Nash-Cournot behaviour by entrants with the incumbent acting as a Stackelberg leader (see Obsborne, 1971 , Gilbert 1989 . According to Richard J. Gilbert (1989, p. 107 ):
«Potential competition has been recognized as a mechanism to control the exploitation of market power at least since the work of J.B. Clark (1902) (1949, p. 207) . Thus, according to him, the minimax regret principle «might be of considerable help in explaining and forecasting economic decisions … There is a tendency, in decision making, to follow more or less consciously a procedure similar to this» (ibid.). 25 Furthermore, the Illinois research originated from the dissatisfaction for the traditional postulate of rationality considered of little or no use under uncertain conditions. Its aim was to investigate the formation of anticipations and plans in economic activity through compilation of a systematic body of data to provide direct evidence of the course of expectations in the US economy (in Modigliani, Cohen, 1961, p. 3) . The second research, on firms' production planning, took place at Carnegie distinction between the two criteria [maximizing and satisficing behaviour] is, indeed, useful to analyze the importance of the outside world for a firm's activity. Given the cost of a decision, if you find yourself in an environment in which a satisficing solution is sufficient to produce profits, you don't go beyond it, for it would be more expensive» (2001, p. 87). 26 
